to the legislative branch that it intends to use fast-track authority to negotiate a trade deal. The decision to approve fast-track powers is separate from the decision to allow trade talks. Assuming Congress approves of the trade negotiations, it must act on the request for fast-track authority within 60 days or the executibe branch automatically receives those powers. The executive branch's United States Trade Representative (USTR) negotiates the trade agreements, presenting the final product to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. These committees hold legislative veto power over the trade bill, having 45 days to consider the bill's fate. Then the Congress has fifteen additional days to consider the bill. Debate is limited to twenty hours, and the final vote either approves or rejects the proposed trade legislation; it cannot be amended.
The authors presented most of this information, but minimized Con gress's input. The executive branch must ask Congress's permission to hold trade talks, and Congress must vote upon and approve such talks. Then the executive branch must request fast-track authority and Congress must approve this procedure. After these votes, the office of the USTR negotiates the agreement and then it is returned to the Congress for yet another vote. Even while the negotiations move ahead, Congress must be kept informed through the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Here Congress does not play a passive role, as Daynes and Sussman would have us believe, as is evidenced by Carla Hill's promise to design the NAFTA agreement in concert with Congress (Farnsworth 13 March 1991) . This is not the stuff of intimidation and dominance. Evi dently the authors regard Congressional votes allowing fast-track authority as tantamount to abdication of power.
It is possible that Daynes and Sussman assume that Congress has been removed from the process because of the mistaken belief that Presidents are more tree trade-oriented than the legislative branch. While there may be a grain ot truth to this, the case certainly is overstated. The United States did not become one of the more open economies in the world as a result of Presidents riding roughshod over Congress, forcing free-trade down its throat. The degree ot free trade that the United States endures is the result of managed conflict. As David Rosenbaum (9 April 1991) described it, "this is an age-old dance: lawmakers, prepared to accept a trade accord even tually, appease local interests by threatening to block the agreement. And Presidents, stepping in tune with the music, emphasize the Congressional threats when they try to win overall trade concessions from other countries." As shrill as the free trade debate has become, it must be kept in mind that it an ideologically free-trading executive branch truly had cut Congress out of the process, NAFTA would not have run to 2,000 pages. It would have taken only six words to say "read my lips, no more tariffs," or a page to explain an across-the-board phasing out of tariff rates. In fact, the bulk of the text of the agreement does not discuss free trade, but exceptions to free trade (Weintraub 1993) . Congress has had, and continues to have, a strong hand in molding trade policy.
In addition to the formal fast-track mechanism, the negotiations be tween the United States, Canada, and Mexico offer a relatively rare oppor tunity to examine the process closely. Daynes and Sussman failed to take advantage of the opportunity, perhaps for good reason. A cursory glance at the unfolding negotiations clearly reveals Congressional input. To narrow the amount of material, I copied and summarized articles concerning the trade talks that appeared in the New York Times between 1991 and 1993. During this time period there were approximately 250 articles dealing with Mexico, and most of them had to do with the trade accord. Most of the re maining articles had to do with Mexican elections and electoral fraud. These articles present a fascinating picture of the crafting of the trade legislation. Ultimately it shows that while the executive branch aggressively pursued the negotiations, Congress clearly helped mold the final agreement.
With respect to NAFTA, Congress has been quite vocal about its con cerns: labor, and the environment. When Carla Hill testified in front of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Don Riegle, Jr. expressed his concerns about the loss of jobs due to companies pulling up investments in the United i ,
States and moving to Mexico to take advantage of the average wage of 57 cents per hour, compared to $10.47 in the United States (Farnsworth 7 February 1991) . Senator John B. Breaux (D-LA) asked Mrs. Hill why a chemical plant in Louisiana, hurt by the cost of complying with the previous year's Clean Air Act, would not move to Mexico, pollute there, and sell its product to the United States duty-free (Farnsworth 7 February 1991) .
On 11 February 1991, the New York Times reported that 37 members of Congress had proposed a "social charter" to address their concerns about environmental, health, and labor issues (Farnsworth 11 February 1991) . The Bush Administration opposed such a charter. However, sensing the growing hostility in Congress, Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) and Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) sent a letter to President Bush warning that if Con gressional concerns about the environment, health, and labor were not taken into account, fast-track authority would not be extended (Farnsworth 13 March 1991) . Within a week Carla Hill once again appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee, promising that the Bush Administration shared their concerns. One issue not adequately addressed by Daynes and Sussman is the degree to which fast-track authority and NAFTA had become intertwined. Much o f the antipathy that arose between the White House and Congress had little to do with the fast-track mechanism; from the very start, the battle was over the substance of NAFTA. For the most part, the fast-track vote was not seen as an issue separate from the negotiations with Mexico and Canada. Even the headlines reporting the fast-track vote read "Congress PaneN Vote to Advance Free-Trade Plan," as if the NAFTA plan itself had been adopted (Clymer 14 May 1991 should not be taken too far, but one slightly cynical interpretation of the proceedings is that the President takes most of the heat of public opposition to any policy associated with him/her, freeing Congress members to vote as they see fit. Beside the consultations that the executive branch was expected to hold with Congress over fast track, there appears to be a sense in Congress that fast track is not so powerful a tool versus Congress as Daynes and Sussman think. There is a feeling that if something unexpected occurred-if, for in stance, the President did not keep his word and tried to back out of one of the side a g r e e m e n t s -Congress still could shape the legislation. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) expressed this sentiment when he said that "under House rules . . . it would be possible to force changes in a Mexico free trade agreement after it had been negotiated, either by changing the fast-track legislation or by altering the legislation needed to put the agreement into effect in the United States" (Bradsher 10 May 1991) . This certainly is not the voice of an institution cowed by the President.
The second hypothesis is that fast-track powers may be anti-democratic due to their impact upon representation. This is particularly true, it is argued, of members of Congress who oppose the agreement. This argument is, in fact, closely related to the first issue. If, as I have asserted, Congress is not turning over responsibility for trade to the President, then it would be hard to make the case that Congresspersons are prevented from representing their constituents. It is true that the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance Committee have become very powerful in such trade bills, but this generally is true of any committee considering legislation. The representa tives who sit on the committees that consider a bill have more influence over it than those who do not. Perhaps if a bill remained under the firm control of Congress, an informal network would allow a representative to have in fluence over the writing of the bill that would not be available if the execu tive branch took control. In other words, the President would make promises to Congresspersons to get them to approve fast-track authority and then once those powers were extended the President would be able to ignore those promises.
The problem with this hypothesis is that it does not stand up tc the evidence. The North American Free Trade Agreement was voted upon by the House of Representatives on 17 November 1993. During the week prior to the vote, President Clinton doled out an estimated $50 billion in "pork" (Anderson and Silverstein 20 December 1993) . A decent number of the promises and projects were related to the representatives' concerns about the impact of NAFTA: the opening of a $10 million Center for the Study of Trade in the Western Hemisphere; reductions of Canadian wheat imports unless Canada cuts back on wheat subsidies; the $250 million funding of the North American Development Bank; promises that the Administration will pressure Mexico to speed up reduction of tariffs on household appliances; trade protection for citrus, sugar, and vegetable producers in Texas and Florida at an estimated cost of $1.4 billion; and a promise to negotiate limits on peanut butter imports from Canada (Anderson and Silverstein 20 Decem ber 1993, 752-753) 
The point here is that the promises were extensive because Congress still has considerable power. Neither George Bush nor Bill Clinton felt as if the approval of fast-track authority had given them a "green light" to do as they pleased with the NAFTA talks. If the Congress had no input, then there would be no reason for the president to buy votes. And while I do not condone pork projects and do not believe that they are the best way for representatives to represent their districts, it is one way they can serve that function. In the final analysis, it matters little whether the pork comes from Congresspersons trading votes, or from the President buying them: one trough is as good as the next.
I have shown in the first portion of this comment that Congress did shape the NAFTA legislation, forcing the President to include side agree ments covering labor, health, and the environment. Nevertheless, it very well could be that a Congressperson did not feel that enough was done to protect American labor. I, for one, share that feeling, but democracy and representation cannot be gauged by its output. Winning is not part of the definition o f democracy. In Mexico, PAN, the longest-lived opposition party, has come to measure democratizing reforms according to whether or not PRI wins the election: only if PRI loses was the election free and fair. The problem is that PAN officials are mostly right in saying that such reforms have not moved Mexico closer to democracy, and probably were not intended to do so, but how would anyone know if the elections were in fact democratic unless the ruling party lost? The fallacy herein is that PRI cannot win without fraud. Daynes and Sussman come dangerously close to using this kind of logic. Their argument almost seems to be that if NAFTA wins, the process was not democratic because NAFTA could not win if the President had not usurped the powers of Congress. Once again, a majority of the members of Congress approved the extension of fast-track authority and then voted upon and approved the North American Free Trade Agree ment. I lost, but the process was democratic.
If the fast-track mechanism is not simply a way for the executive branch to steal away the legislative branch's duties, then what is the reason for creating such powers? The primary purpose for fast-track does not reside in domestic institutional power struggles. This process of managed conflict was created to wrestle the best foreign trade agreements that the United States could get by presenting a more unified front. This is not to say that the constant struggle between the President and Congress disappears and a cozy alliance forms. Both branches desire some degree of free trade, and managed conflict allows for the President and Congress to achieve such agreements in the face of protectionist pressures, both at home and abroad.
The free-trade orientation of the executive and legislative branches was challenged, according to Robert Gilpin (1987, 192) , as early as the 1950s when the European Economic Community (EEC) formed. This trend only has strengthened over time as the Europeans moved closer than many thought possible to economic and political integration. As Giulpin (1987, 194) notes, "In the 1980s, due to the macroeconomic policy of the Reagan Administration and the overvalued dollar, the American competitive position deteriorated. . . . In the first part of 1986, the United States had achieved the impossible: it had a deficit with almost every one of its trade partners." Such exposure to foreign competition helped to crystallize the opposition to free trade. And it was the strength of the proponents of protectionism that necessitated the cooperation-or managed conflict-of the White House and the Congress.
In addition to the diminishing support for free trade, the GATT talks became ever more combative. During GATT's early years rather easy suc cess was the norm, with each round lasting only about a year. The Kennedy round, however, would take five years to complete. The Tokyo round (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) would deal with such difficult issues as nontariff barriers, Japanese and "Baby Dragon" trade protectionism, export subsidies, and liberalized trade in agriculture (Gilpin 1987, 196) . President Nixon thus realized that such trade talks would be politically sensitive, and requested fast-track powers to facilitate the negotiations. The real story of the Tokyo talks and even the preceding Kennedy round was that the GATT was run ning out of relatively easy tariff cuts, ones that were not painful to the industrialized countries. It was within this context that fast track became important. The legislative and executive branches have similar, though not identical interests in freer (if not free) trade. However, as freer trade initiatives became harder to come by, the two branches worked out a mech anism that would ease foreign concerns about the possibility of negotiating with the United States for a couple of years, only to have Congress rewrite the administration's bill in committee.
A final reason for fast-track authority came to light during the weeks that followed the end of the negotiations: the Mexican government became more and more suspicious of the United States' motives for "delaying" the accord's approval.2 The feeling was that if the President of the United States really wanted the agreement approved, it would be approved (Canela [n.d.] ). What students of American government consider the complexities of our legislative process can look like intrigue to foreign governments. It must be remembered that while all things "gringo" are regarded with less suspicion than in years past, that feeling is not buried too deeply in the Mexican psyche. A poll of Mexicans conducted not too long ago by Excelsior in Mexico City found that 59 percent of the respondents called the United States an "enemy country" (Heilman 1988, 271 n27) . In fact, Mexicans are ever mindful that they lost half of their territory to the United States during the last century (Pastor and Castaneda 1989, 23-38 ). Mexico's wariness of the United States may be greater than that of other countries, but the difference is one of degree, not of kind. Even the industrial countries have shown impatience with America's negotiating style. As Lang and Hines (1993, 57) point out, "The USA in recent years has used existing GATT measures to wave the big trade stick at a long list of countries, including: India, Brazil, China, The EC, Japan, Mexico, Venezuela, and Thailand." With such political sensitivity and suspicion confronting trade negotiators, it is no wonder that the President and Congress have worked out a coopera tive arrangement. If trade talks are contentious, the last thing the USTR needs is to finish a battle at the negotiating table only to turn to do battle in Capitol Hill committee hearing rooms. Thus, a final reason for fast-track authority has been to assure the government of a country that the agreement they negotiate with USTR negotiators will not be rwritten by Congress.
Conclusion
The growing complexity of trade and trade legislation has induced a change in the relationship between the President and Congress. The contri bution of Daynes and Sussman is to identify the potential dangers such change can bring about. They argued that the President has seized Con gress's constitutional duty to regulate commerce and that this in turn has abrogated Congress's ability to represent constituents.
I have shown that Congress in fact did mold the NAFTA agreement. Their basic concerns were the protection of labor, health, and the environ ment. Prior to Senator Bentsen's and Congressman Rostenkowski's threat not to extend fast-track powers to President Bush, the President opposed these so-called side agreements. Within a week of receipt of the letter, President Bush sent Carla Hill to reassure Congress that the President would offer concessions. The 150-page "action plan" pledged to protect workers and the environment, and to maintain close contact with Congress during the process. As for representation, Congress retains the power to "just say no" to the President's request for fast-track authority as well as the ability to negotiate a trade agreement. Senator Gephardt even expressed the belief that it Congress were united it could make changes in the NAFTA even after it was negotiated. Finally, it should be remembered that having your way is not part ot the definition of democracy. Showing that the President prevailed on a number ot issues or that some Congresspersons did not think that workers were protected sufficiently does not mean that the process was not democratic.
